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Can political realism be action guiding? 
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ABSTRACT: 
Various political realists claim the superior 'action guiding' qualities of their way of 
approaching normative political theory, as compared to 'liberal moralism'. This paper 
subjects that claim to critique. I first clarify the general idea of action guidance, and 
identify two types of guidance that a political theory might try to offer - 'prescriptive 
action-guidance' and 'orienting action-guidance' - together with the conditions that must 
be met before we can understand such guidance as having been successfully offered. I 
then go on to argue that if we take realist understandings of political psychology 
seriously, then realist attempts to offer action guidance appear to fail by realism’s own 
lights. I demonstrate this by means of engagement with a variety of different realist 
theorists. 
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The broad approach in political theory known as ‘political realism’ has been described as 
“parasitic on what it is not” (Horton, 2010, p. 445). By that is meant that political realism 
has in significant part been preoccupied with making a negative critique of what it sees 
as the dominant ‘liberal moralist’ mode of normative political theory. One central strand 
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 2 
of that critique has been to decry liberal moralism’s prospects for successfully offering 
‘action guidance’. As John Horton puts it, one of the “two related but distinguishable broad 
lines of criticism that lie at the heart of the realist critique” 1 of liberal moralism is that 
the latter  
can provide us with little normative guidance about how we should act in the real 
world. Because the idealising assumptions of liberal moralism leave it at some 
considerable remove from the world as it is … its bearing on how we should act, 
even were one to accept the validity of its normative principles, becomes at best 
vague and at worst irrelevant (Horton, 2017, pp. 490-91). 
One particular aspect of “the world as it is” that realists understand liberal 
moralists to problematically idealise away, or indeed to fail even to recognise, is the 
inevitability of disagreement. As Matt Sleat puts it: “Disagreement in politics is the rule 
rather than the exception. The persistence of disagreement is one of the fundamental and 
‘stubborn facts’ of political life which ensures that there is rarely any natural harmony or 
order in human affairs” (2013, p. 47). Realists worry that liberal moralism, rather than 
recognising this, instead treats politics merely as a site for the application of a ‘pre-
political’ morality, with the latter often grounded in the idea of consensus.  
A second aspect of “the world as it is” purportedly ignored by liberal moralism is 
persons’ actual psychological dispositions and capacities. Consider, for a paradigmatic 
example, Rawls’s ‘ideal theory’ of justice, wherein it is assumed that all citizens will 
reliably be led by their ‘sense of justice’. Each person is postulated to be capable of 
realising their ‘full autonomy’, that is, of “affirming the first principles of justice that 
would be adopted [in the original position] … [and] acting from these principles as their 
sense of justice dictates” (Rawls, 1980, p. 528). For Rawls, “full autonomy is a feasible 
ideal for political life”, consistent with the “capacities of human nature” (1980, p. 534). 
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The picture of human psychology developed is one in which persons are capable of 
consistently being guided and motivated by ‘reason’ put in service of their ‘two moral 
powers’. These two moral powers – the capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of 
the good – essentially constitute the totality of the conception of the person in Rawls’s 
constructivism.2  
Political realism, by comparison, claims a “more complex moral and political 
psychology” (Galston, 2010, p. 408). This more complex psychology – which I will refer 
to hereafter as realpsychologie for short – has at least three main aspects. First, realists 
explicitly acknowledge the existence, permanence and theoretical relevance of a wide 
range of political emotions and attitudes such as “[a]nger, hatred, the urge to dominate, 
the desire to destroy”, as well as love, friendship, loyalty, partiality and so on (Galston, 
2010, p. 398). Second and relatedly, realists voice considerable scepticism about the 
ability of ‘moral reason’ to ground our political convictions, or to reliably to keep in check 
either our irrational emotions and passions or our rational self-interest. Reason must 
take its place as a political motivator alongside, for instance, “the role of interests, 
rhetoric, political leadership, appeals to history and, maybe more controversially, the use 
of coercive force to generate desired human responses” (Rossi and Sleat, 2014, p. 691). 
As a result, “real-world political deliberation is and will always be incompletely rational” 
(Galston, 2010, p. 398-9).  
Third, realism emphasises “differences in cognitive and moral capacities”: persons are 
not equally capable of reasoned reflection, and neither are they equally (in)capable of 
stemming irrational impulses (Galston, 2010, p. 399).  To stipulate, as Rawls does, that all 
persons are equal in their capacity to develop their ‘two moral powers’, then, is to 
stipulate something that is not and will not be true.  
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  Ideal theory of the Rawlsian type thus fails to recognise or wishes away aspects 
of “the world as it is” in a way that political realists believe renders it unable to offer 
successful guidance for action. And ‘non-ideal theory’ makes the same kind of mistake, 
because it continues to view things like conflict, disagreement and limited ‘moral 
motivation’ as non-ideal. But for realists, such things “cannot, strictly speaking, be seen 
as politically non-ideal insofar as they are necessary preconditions of politics itself”. This 
is important, because “if the attempt to be more fact-sensitive is undertaken within the 
context of the liberal conception of politics, then realists suspect any normative 
recommendations [non-ideal theory] makes will likely still be unsuccessful guides to 
action insofar as it misunderstands what politics is” (Sleat, 2016, p. 36).  
 The question naturally then arises whether political realism can do better on this 
front. Can political realism offer us successful guides to action? That is the question I will 
be considering here. One might be minded to reject the question itself as mistaken. 
Certain strands of realist thought, after all, seek not to offer guidance, but focus instead 
on the description and interpretation of politics (e.g. Freeden, 2012; Newey, 2001). 
Nevertheless, I take Horton to be right when he states that “the majority of realists…want 
to harness their approach to the aim of providing practically useful political advice” 
(Horton, 2018, p. 132). It is this “majority of realists” with whom this paper is concerned. 
Such realists do appear to believe that they possess an advantage over methodological 
competitors in the action-guiding stakes. As Edward Hall puts it, for example, "action-
guiding political theory should … take certain features of our politics as given, most 
centrally the reality of political opposition and the passions and experiences that 
motivate them" (2017, p. 283). Since realists believe that this is precisely what realism 
does, the implication is that it is the realist in particular who can offer “action-guiding 
political theory”.  
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My argument, however, is that political realism’s own premises entail that it can 
do no such thing. In particular, if we take realists’ psychological claims seriously, then it 
must follow that their attempts to offer successful action guidance fail. In order to make 
good on this argument it is first necessary to elaborate upon the idea of ‘action guidance’. 
In doing so, I will distinguish two kinds of action guidance – prescriptive action guidance 
and orienting action guidance – together with what I call their respective ‘success 
conditions’. The proceeding two sections then take each of these variants in turn, 
considering examples of realists apparently engaging in attempts to offer such guidance. 
In each case, I will argue that they fail by their own lights.  
 
Action Guidance  
Despite the frequency with which political theory’s methodological disputes make easy 
reference to the idea of action guidance, quite what is at issue is not always clear. In this 
section I will therefore first clarify the general idea of action-guidance as I understand it 
to be treated by political theorists, and as it will correspondingly be treated in this paper. 
I will then identify two variants of action guidance, together with their respective ‘success 
conditions’ for the successful offering of guidance.  
As I understand the relevant debates, for a theory to be considered action-guiding, 
it is not the case that that theory must in fact ever guide political action in the real world; 
the quality ‘action-guiding’ denotes the successful offering of guidance for political action, 
not the actual guiding of action. This is admittedly somewhat counter-intuitive given the 
phrase ‘action guidance’. Even more counter-intuitively, however, the successful offering 
of action-guidance itself does not seem to entail a given theory in fact being widely 
publicised within the population the theory supposedly aspires to guide. This is strange, 
since one might reasonably expect it to be a basic feature of A offering something to B 
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that B comes to learn about the offer. And yet the issue of action-guidance is typically 
treated separately from what we can call the problem of publicity, which is the problem 
that modern academic political theory extremely rarely finds its way into the ‘public 
sphere’. There are various reasons for this lack of publicity (Vincent, 2004: 27; see also 
Finlayson, 2015), which are surely of central importance to any political theory that seeks 
to impact upon real-world politics. Nevertheless, disputes between political theorists 
about the ‘action-guiding’ qualities of different methodological approaches largely 
proceed as if the publicity problem does not exist.3 What is apparently being assumed by 
all parties to these disputes is a counterfactual world in which political theorists write for 
and are read by the public at large, or else a world in which the tenets of the various 
approaches to normative political thinking simply implant themselves in the minds of the 
public in some other way. When realists (or anyone else) trumpet the superior action-
guiding qualities of their way of doing things, then, I take them to be arguing that, in this 
counterfactual world, it is their approach that can best provide action-guidance.  
Another way of putting this would be that realism has the best potential to be 
action-guiding, were the publicity problem to be solved. In my view that would be a 
preferable way to think about the idea of action-guidance since it recouples the publicity 
problem to the idea of action-guidance in a way that makes sense if theorists actually care 
about guiding action. Nevertheless, this paper grants the separation of the action-
guidance issue from the publicity issue, and thus the argument that unfolds in this paper 
does not appeal in any way to realist theory’s connection (or lack thereof) to the public 
sphere. Instead, my argument is an internal critique of realist theorising. This argument 
proceeds from a recognition of the perspectival nature of action-guidance claims: 
judgements of the action-guiding qualities of a theory are conditional, among other 
things, upon the compatibility between the normative demands of the theory in question 
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and the judger’s pre-given understanding of politics, political agents, and their 
possibilities. Disagreement about the action-guiding qualities of a given theory occur in 
large part because of underlying disagreements about politics and its limits. My aim is 
this paper is not to adjudicate between these underlying disagreements, but rather to 
highlight how political realists’ normative offerings are inconsistent with their own 
understanding of politics, and thus ought to be judged as failing to be action guiding by 
realists themselves.  
 With these clarifications out of the way, let us know look at two specific forms of 
action-guidance and their respective ‘success conditions’. As will be made clear, certain 
of these conditions are explicitly perspectival.  
 
Prescriptive action-guidance  
Much political theorising concerns itself with offering a specific answer to some 
particular normative question. What does distributive justice demand, amongst whom? 
When ought a political institution to be considered legitimate? When is a war just? Do 
states have a right to close their borders to potential immigrants as they see fit? And so 
forth. Theorists have offered numerous different answers to these and many other 
questions, with numerous different justifications. All such answers profess to tell us 
something about how things should be – they offer us specific political prescriptions.  
 When, though, are these prescriptions “action guiding”? No one, as far as I’m 
aware, takes the view that a theory is action guiding whenever it offers an answer to a 
normative question. Rather, I suggest that such theories are considered action-guiding 
when they meet three types of condition.4 The first are formal conditions, relating to the 
basic legibility or coherence of the answer being offered. Suppose, for example, that a 
theory prescribes adherence to two main principles: Principle 1 says “do X” and Principle 
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2 says “don’t do X”. This is obviously not guidance that anyone could possibly act upon. 
One formal condition, then, is that the prescription is internally consistent.  
The second kind of success condition is a feasibility condition. There are two 
senses in which a theory might fail to meet this condition. The first, strict sense is by 
recommending the impossible. Guidance that literally cannot be acted upon by definition 
fails in the function of offering guidance to be acted upon.5 Relevantly for us here, 
normative political theories can face the criticism that they are strictly infeasible because 
their prescriptions are incompatible with the perceived limits of human nature. We have 
already seen that this is part of political realism’s critique of Rawlsian moralism, 
proceeding from the realist’s realpsychologie.  
A second way that a theory can fail to meet the feasibility condition is by declining 
to engage with the question of how the theory might be implemented, given the practical 
gulf between what the theory recommends and the position in which we currently find 
ourselves.6  It may be that the gulf is so large that we simply cannot know how to proceed. 
This kind of charge is often levelled against ideal theory by non-ideal theorists.7 Realists 
too make a similar complaint. As Raymond Geuss vividly puts it (fairly or not), for 
example, “[t]he often noted absence in Rawls of any theory about how his ideal demands 
are to be implemented is not a tiny mole that serves as a beauty spot to set off the radiance 
of the rest of the face, but the epidermal sign of a lethal tumour” (2008, p. 93-4). 
The final success condition is a conceptual condition, which requires that a theory 
offer guidance for the matter at hand. If I am looking for guidance regarding how to build 
my new flat-pack wardrobe, and you pass me a manual for installing a new oven, you 
haven’t offered me guidance I can use for the matter at hand. Similarly, a normative 
theory isn’t a political theory if it isn’t recognisably about politics. Again, as we saw above, 
this idea forms part of the realist critique of liberal moralism, where the latter 
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purportedly ‘misunderstands’ what politics is.8 To fail to meet the conceptual condition 
is important with respect to action guidance if it will lead to failing the feasibility condition: 
just as I can’t feasibly use an oven manual to successfully build a wardrobe, it will not be 
feasible for a polity to meet the demands of a normative theory that radically 
misunderstands what politics is like or might become. This is in fact the fuller thrust of 
Geuss’s above complaint against Rawls: because Rawls doesn’t recognise the central place 
of power in politics, he is unable to tell us anything about how his principles of justice 
might come to be realised.  
 What should be clear is that whether or not one adjudges the feasibility and 
conceptual conditions to have been met by any one prescriptive theory depends upon 
one’s antecedent view about the constitutive features of politics and its possibilities. In 
that sense, judgements about whether a prescriptive theory is action-guiding are 
perspectival. For the realist, prescriptive theories that hypothesise stable moral 
consensus, and/or overestimate the potential of human psychology relative to the realist 
understanding thereof, will inevitably fail to be action-guiding. To suppose that there 
could be moral consensus is to misunderstand politics and why we need it, thus flouting 
the conceptual condition (and thereby the feasibility condition). And theories that ignore 
realpsychologie will, for realists, fail the feasibility condition directly.  
 
Orienting action guidance  
In my understanding, most realists do not engage in the practice of offering prescriptive 
action guidance (although we will consider one apparent instance shortly). This is not 
surprising: one consequence of realists’ emphasis upon the limited power of reason and 
the inevitability of deep disagreement, as well as their underscoring of the importance of 
political context and the role of situated political judgement (see Rossi and Sleat, 2014, p. 
 10 
694), is that they are reticent to construct abstract grand theories that are supposed to 
provide us with determinate prescriptions for real world polities. The question then 
arises, however, as to what it is that realists who reject the prescriptive mode are talking 
about when they profess the superior ‘action-guiding’ qualities of political realism as 
compared to liberal moralism.  
I propose that these realists are engaged in offering what I will call ‘orienting 
action-guidance’. I said with respect to prescriptive action-guidance that whether or not 
one understands such guidance successfully to have been offered in any one instance will 
depend upon one’s perspective of the constitutive features of politics and its possibilities. 
To offer orienting action guidance involves offering an account of (some of) these 
constitutive features of politics. This account – or ‘orientation’ – can then be used to 
illuminate, interpret and evaluate extant political circumstances, and to inform 
subsequent political action. Unlike prescriptive action guidance, however, precisely what 
political action ought to follow is not prescribed by the theory.  
The success conditions for orienting action guidance are different to those for 
prescriptive action guidance. With respect to the conceptual condition, there is no fully 
pre-established account of ‘the political’ against which to judge orienting action-guidance 
– rather, it is partly an account of (some aspect of) the political that such guidance is 
offering. By contrast, formal conditions hold: as with prescriptive action guidance, it is a 
mark of failure if orienting action guidance is, for example, internally self-contradictory.  
 The feasibility condition is more complex. In the case of orienting action-guidance, 
there is no immediate political prescription which can be adjudged feasible or infeasible 
to implement. Instead, a way of thinking about politics is offered. The relevant feasibility 
consideration here, I contend, is whether this way of thinking about politics can be 
psychologically feasible as an orientation to be internalised and employed by persons in 
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their political lives. Again, the judgement about feasibility is perspectival: it will be 
relative to a particular account of political psychology. In this paper we will judge the 
feasibility of political realism’s orienting action-guiding from the perspective of realism’s 
own political psychology.  
Does orienting action guidance meet this feasibility condition so long as someone 
is able to internalise it, even if it is psychologically too demanding (according to some 
particular account of political psychology) for the vast majority of people? The answer 
here depends upon the notional ‘target’ for guidance.9 If the guidance is only ever 
designed for some small subset of society – an intelligentsia, say, as with Richard Rorty’s 
appeal for “ironism” (1997) – without any desire that it should have wider political 
import, then it will not matter if that guidance is infeasible as an orientation for citizens 
generally to internalise and act upon, as long as it is feasible for that subset. On the other 
hand, if the notional target of the guidance is the citizenry generally, then the guidance 
will indeed fail to meet the feasibility condition if it is too psychologically demanding for 
most people to internalise and act upon.  
 My aim in what now follows is to demonstrate that, if political realists take their 
own perspective on politics seriously – in particular, what I have called realpsychologie – 
then they will, by their own lights, struggle to offer either prescriptive or orienting action 
guidance. I pursue this aim by surveying a range of realist attempts at normativity which, 
I suggest, are indicative of a problem for realism more generally.   
 
Realism and prescriptive action-guidance  
As I have noted, the offering of prescriptive action guidance is a rarity in realist theorising. 
However, before moving on to orienting action guidance, I want to consider one 
instructive case that appears to fit the prescriptive model. My claim is that it fails to 
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demonstrate that it can meet the feasibility condition, in a way representative of any 
attempt realists may make to offer prescriptive guidance.  
Robert Jubb makes the case that the tenets of political realism are compatible with 
“high levels of material equality”, even though defences of the latter are more typically 
the preserve of the moralistic, ideal-theoretic theorising that realism decries (Jubb, 2015, 
p. 69). Indeed, in Jubb’s view, such equality may be a requirement, from a realist 
perspective, for a legitimate political order (at least today). Jubb is then understandable 
as prescribing a specific criterion of political legitimacy from realist starting premises. 
Jubb’s argument appeals to what he calls “negative non-intrinsic egalitarianism” (NNIE). 
Non-intrinsic arguments for equality value that equality not because it is valuable in and 
of itself, but “because of a set of social relations to which it is closely connected” (Jubb, 
2015, p. 681). Here, Jubb concurs with Martin O’Neill that distributive equality is 
necessary “to avoid the badness of servility, exploitation, domination and differences in 
status” (quoted in Jubb, 2015, p. 681). Negative non-intrinsic arguments for equality 
decline to say anything further about what the best way of life for a given political 
community is – equality is not offered as a positive ideal, but only as a means of avoiding 
the aforementioned badness.  
 NNIE is, says Jubb “appropriately political”, by which is meant that it is compatible 
with how realists understand politics. In particular, Jubb emphasises that it avoids 
“drawing on unavailable moral agreement” (2015, p. 683), by grounding distributive 
equality on the avoidance of “widely acknowledged bads rather than contentious claims 
about the good” and ideal social order (2015, p. 679). Let us grant this specific claim about 
the avoidance of appeal to unavailable moral agreement, in order to consider NNIE’s 
compatibility with another realist premise: can NNIE really, as Jubb implies it can, “avoid 
placing too much motivational stress on agents like us, with our … inability to consistently 
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govern ourselves through reason alone?” (Jubb, 2015, p. 681)? In other words, is NNIE 
consistent with the realist premise of realpsychologie?  
 Whether or not a theory “places too much motivational stress on us” depends on 
what the theory is trying to motivate us to do. At one point, Jubb makes the following 
statement:  
A non-intrinsic egalitarianism will be vulnerable to attack by realists if its 
justification and implementation depend on moral or psychological resources 
unavailable in the circumstances of politics generally or the political situation in 
which its particular audience find themselves (Jubb, 2015, p. 681, my emphasis) 
Since it is Jubb’s claim that NNIE is compatible with realism’s premises, he clearly does 
not see it as vulnerable in this way. Thus for Jubb, the justification and implementation of 
NNIE can avoid placing too much motivational stress on agents like us.  
 What, though, does “implementation” mean here? One apparent possibility is that 
a theory is “implemented” simply when its political prescriptions – in this case, “high 
levels of material equality” – are realised in the world.  That cannot be what Jubb means 
by ‘implementation’, however, since on that understanding both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
non-intrinsic egalitarianisms – indeed, all egalitarianisms10 – would be as 
“implementable” as each other, whereas Jubb wants to identify NNIE as uniquely 
motivationally plausible. The alternative then is that for NNIE (or any other prescriptive 
theory) to be “implemented” is for the relevant policy prescription to be, to some 
significant degree, realised and publicly sustained by the justification for the prescription 
that the theory offers. I thus take the implied claim that NNIE is implementable to amount 
to the claim that NNIE is action-guiding (i.e. meets the formal, feasibility and conceptual 
conditions for prescriptive action-guidance).  
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 The problem for the realist, however, is that if we take realpsychologie seriously, 
then it’s far from clear that public commitment to NNIE could ever be a major part of the 
explanation for why an egalitarian distribution might come to exist. Indeed, Jubb himself 
is alert to the issue here. In consideration of the practical possibilities of instituting an 
egalitarian distribution, Jubb raises the question of whether, inter alia, “the beneficiaries 
of an egalitarian politics can dominate the domestic political scene to the extent 
necessary to restructure the content and distribution of property rights” (2015, p. 683). 
What’s being recognised here is that if and when an egalitarian outcome is achieved, a 
major part of how it will be achieved will be the successful, self-interested political 
struggle of a particular sub-societal constituency, rather than a societal-level subscription 
to the tenets of NNIE. And indeed, where such an egalitarian outcome is achieved, it will 
in reality surely be on account of a constellation of factors: a propitious balance of 
political forces, a diverse range of political and moral convictions (some of them 
egalitarian, and of them, some ‘negative’ and ‘non-intrinsic’, but some positive and 
comprehensive), unreflective nationalist sentiment, the skill and charisma of political 
leaders, and so on.  
 Given this, what is the basis for supposing that NNIE is “implementable” in the 
second, action-guiding sense identified above, and indeed uniquely implementable 
among theoretical defences of egalitarian distributions? A sufficient answer to this 
question would first need to tell us something about the particular political and 
sociological circumstances that represent the qualitative threshold between a given 
policy – in this case, “high levels of material equality” – being enacted (regardless of 
cause), and a particular theoretical justification for that policy – in this case, NNIE – being 
implemented in the action-guiding sense. What is it that makes the difference between 
bare policy enactment and theory implementation? What evidence of the way citizens 
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think and act, for example, would we need to observe in a given instance before we were 
happy to say that a theoretical justification, and not just a policy, had been 
“implemented”? Jubb does not engage with this question, however. His “main concern” in 
his paper is “to show that at a suitably abstract and general level, non-intrinsic 
egalitarianism can meet realism’s methodological demands” (2015, p. 684). In other 
words, his main concern is justification itself, not “implementation”. That is fair enough – 
but since Jubb does not address the threshold question, the claim that NNIE can be 
implemented without depending on “unavailable moral or psychological resources” is 
unsupported. Moreover, it is very difficult to see how, if we take realist premises 
seriously, the claim could be supported without proffering an extremely weak account of 
the threshold that would mean it was difficult to distinguish policy enactment from 
theory implementation at all.  
 The dynamic at evidence here will presumably befall any prescriptive realist 
theory that attempts to claim that it is “implementable” or action-guiding: where 
‘implementation’ is to be understood merely as enactment of the policy prescription that 
the theory recommends, the claim will not distinguish realist theories from other kinds 
of theory that offer a different kind of justification for the same prescription, and so won’t 
vindicate any claim to the superior action-guiding qualities of realist theory. On the other 
hand, where the claim is to be understood as saying that realist justifications, in 
particular, can be motivationally efficacious in publicly sustaining a given policy 
prescription, realists will have an extremely hard time vindicating such a claim without 
either ignoring their own methodological premises or offering an understanding of 
theory implementation so weak that it is indistinguishable from mere policy 
implementation. At least, prescriptive realists keen to emphasise the action guiding 
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qualities of their way of doing political theory will need actively to attempt this difficult 
task. 
 
Orienting action-guidance  
I want now to consider three instances of realist attempts to offer orienting action 
guidance. In each instance, such attempts ignore realism’s own realpsychologie premise, 
and thus fail to meet one or more success condition for having offered action guidance.  
 
Modus vivendi 
A political modus vivendi is a particular kind of settlement on terms of coexistence 
between parties who radically disagree. The settlement is no party’s preferred solution 
to the issue(s) at hand, but it is tolerable to each in the interests of avoiding further 
escalation of the dispute. As Sleat puts it, a modus vivendi “will have a sort of ‘second best’ 
quality; it is not what any citizen would ideally choose but they accept and endorse it on 
the grounds that it secures peace amongst radical disagreement and conflict” (Sleat, 
2013, p. 96). This distinguishes a modus vivendi from the Rawlsian idea of an ‘overlapping 
consensus’, since the latter anticipates the possibility of moral agreement (albeit for 
diverse reasons) on citizens’ political ‘first choice’.  
 The idea of a modus vivendi has been employed by theorists for at least two, 
slightly different purposes: first, as a way to think about liberal politics that eschews the 
search for a moral consensus on liberal values (e.g. Gray, 2000; McCabe, 2010); and 
second, as a way to think about the demands of legitimacy (e.g. Horton, 2018). I propose 
here to concentrate on the first group, and on John Gray in particular, as an apparent 
example of appealing to the idea of modus vivendi in the process of offering orienting 
action guidance. Although Gray does not speak in the language of ‘political realism’, his 
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work has been described by one card-carrying realist as “one way to develop the new 
realist programme in political theory” (Rossi, 2018, p. 95). We will here understand Gray, 
then, as a realist liberal.  
 Gray introduces the idea of modus vivendi as an implication of one way – in his 
view the right way – of thinking about the liberal value of toleration. Instead of viewing 
toleration as means to eventual rational consensus about the truth, it should rather be 
viewed as a condition of peace among permanently incommensurable ways of life. Gray 
makes the following statement:  
If the liberal project is to be renewed, the ambiguity that has haunted it from its 
origins must be resolved. The idea of toleration as a means to a universal 
consensus on values must be given up, with the adoption instead of a project of 
modus vivendi among ways of life animated by permanently divergent values 
(Gray, 2000, p. 25) 
 What are we to make of this statement? What is it? It certainly seems like a piece of 
guidance: liberal societies should adopt a “project of modus vivendi”. What does this 
project involve? Largely it seems to be a matter of reconceiving of liberal institutions in a 
particular way:  
We will come to think of human rights as convenient articles of peace, whereby 
individuals and communities with conflicting values and interests may consent to 
coexist. We will think of democratic government not as an expression of a 
universal right to national self-determination, but as an expedient, enabling 
disparate communities to reach common decisions and to remove governments 
without violence. We will think of these inheritances not as embodying universal 
principles, but as conventions, which can and should be refashioned in a world of 
plural societies and patchwork states (2000, p. 106) 
 18 
The main point then, is to start to think about liberal politics in a different way, rather 
than to start doing different things. I take this to be a piece of orienting action-guidance.  
Gray has faced some criticism for apparently supposing that a modus vivendi will 
necessarily provide us with a form of liberalism (Horton, 2018: 133; Rossi, 2018), and, 
relatedly, for imposing a moral minimum on any legitimate modus vivendi in a way that 
appears to ignore the fact that pervasive political disagreement will hold with respect to 
that minimum too (e.g. Sleat, 2013, p. 107). I want here though to set aside those 
particular critiques, and instead consider Gray’s endorsement of the adoption of the 
‘project of modus vivendi’ with the premises of deep disagreement and realpsychologie in 
mind.   
Gray is frank that “the ethical theory underpinning modus vivendi is value-
pluralism” (2000, p. 6), and that “modus vivendi articulates a view of the good. It is an 
application of value-pluralism to political practice” (2000, p. 25). There appears to be an 
obvious problem here: aren’t we being offered a particular view of the good to coalesce 
around as a response to the inevitability of diversity of views of the good? Apparently not 
– for we are also told that “modus vivendi is a political project, not a moral ideal. It does 
not preach compromise as an ideal for all to follow. Nor does it attempt to convert the 
world to value-pluralism” (2000, p. 25). So: modern diverse societies ought to adopt the 
political project of modus vivendi, in which liberal institutions come to be explicitly 
understood as political conventions, rather than as the embodiment of universal 
principles. The theoretical justification for this entreaty involves an appeal to value-
pluralism, but the persons who are to change their thinking are not to be expected to 
become value pluralists. Indeed, it would be a “vain hope” to expect “human beings to 
cease to make universal claims for their ways of life”. Persons are then to continue to hold 
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on to these universal claims, while also fostering a “commitment to common institutions 
in which the claims of rival values can be reconciled” (2000, p. 25).  
But what is the reason why people might come to foster such a commitment, in 
Gray’s view? On what basis would they be moved to adopt the project of modus vivendi, if 
not via endorsement of value pluralism? One apparently obvious answer here is 
agreement about the value of peace and security: all parties may be motivated to accept 
a modus vivendi because doing so is preferable to an alternative of ongoing war. A 
problem with this answer though is that, as certain realists have themselves pointed out, 
there may not exist any agreement about how much security it is desirable to trade off 
against other political values (Sleat, 2013, p. 101).   
Even setting aside that problem, however, a mutual recognition of the value of 
peace is not sufficient ground for a genuine commitment to the political project of modus 
vivendi among parties that continue to hold universalist visions of the good. We must note 
here that there is an important difference between (i) there being reason for a party to 
accept a modus vivendi in particular political circumstances, and (ii) that party self-
consciously ‘adopting the project of modus vivendi’. The valuing of peace may lead to the 
acceptance of a modus vivendi in circumstances in which one doesn’t foresee that their 
universal vision of the good can win the day. But one’s acceptance of that modus vivendi 
for that reason does not mean that one has adopted the project of modus vivendi. The 
latter involves a personal reconceiving of the purpose of liberal political institutions, and 
the willingness to engage in that reconceiving seems to entail recognition of value 
pluralism – or at least a rejection of the universal claims for one’s way of life. Gray is then 
trading on an ambiguity between (i) and (ii) when he states that “modus vivendi can be 
pursued by ways of life having opposed views of the good” (2000, p. 25). This is true of 
(i) but is not demonstrated with respect to (ii): it has not been explained on what basis 
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someone who isn’t a value pluralist can become psychologically “committed” to Gray’s 
project of modus vivendi. In other words, Gray does not offer us anything to suggest that 
the feasibility condition for successful orienting action guidance can be met, since he 
doesn’t show how it can be psychologically for those who hold universalist visions of the 
good.    
This is true for all universalisms, but the problem is particularly severe when we 
consider what is asked of a liberal who endorses what Gray calls the first ‘face’ (i.e. the 
moralist face) of liberalism. A liberal of this type is seemingly expected to think two 
contradictory things at once about liberal institutions: that those institutions are mere 
political conventions that enable the reconciling of diverse ways of life, rather than 
institutional expressions of universal liberal principles (per the ‘project of modus 
vivendi’); and that they are indeed the expression of such universal principles (per their 
universalist liberal commitments, which Gray has said it would be a “vain hope” to expect 
them to give up). For these universalist liberals, then, the problem is not merely that they 
are urged to reorient themselves politically without sufficient indication of why they 
might be motivated to do so - it’s that they’re being asked to think the impossible. The 
‘project of modus vivendi’ here flounders on two separate levels of psychological 
implausibility. In other words, it fails not just to meet the feasibility success condition, 
but also a formal success condition: basic coherence. 
Our discussion of Gray’s project of modus vivendi, understood as prospective 
orienting action-guidance, in some ways mirrors the previous discussion of Jubb’s realist 
egalitarianism. As with an egalitarian distribution, modus vivendi outcomes (i.e. mutual 
acceptance of ‘second best’ circumstances) are potentially politically possible. But that is 
something different to saying that modus vivendi outcomes sustained by public 
endorsement of the philosophical project of modus vivendi are possible. It is the latter 
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which is at issue when thinking about modus vivendi as an action-guiding theory, and it is 
in the latter sense that modus vivendi is left wanting as regards its psychological 
plausibility (and formal legibility). It therefore cannot represent a plausible action-
guiding theory for realists who are explicitly committed to a ‘more complex moral and 
political psychology’.  
 
Williams and the nature of political opposition 
Among the complaints that Bernard Williams raises against ‘political moralism’ is that it 
“construes conflictual political thought in society in terms of rival elaborations of a moral 
text” (2005, p. 12). This complaint is levelled explicitly at Ronald Dworkin. Part of the 
charge here is that the moralist imagines that what is (or should be) going on when we 
disagree politically is an exchange of purely moral arguments about how society should 
be best structured, equivalent to the purely legal argument that is going on when 
supreme court justices disagree about how best to interpret a constitutional text. But as 
Williams rightly points out, “this is not the nature of opposition between political 
opponents” (2005, p. 12). That is because, in fact, a range of disparate factors go in to 
determining our political convictions:  
our and others’ convictions have to a great degree been the product of previous 
historical conditions, and of an obscure mixture of beliefs (many incompatible 
with one another), passions, interests, and so forth… we would be merely naive if 
we took our convictions, and those of our opponents, as simply autonomous 
products of moral reason rather than as another product of historical conditions 
(2005, p. 12-13) 
‘Moral reason’ may be a part of the reason why we hold the political convictions we hold, 
but only a part.  
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 Williams believes that this truth should mean “that we take certain kinds of view 
of our allies and opponents”. Among other things: 
we should not think that what we have to do is simply to argue with those who 
disagree [with us]: treating them as opponents can, oddly enough, show more 
respect for them as political actors than treating them simply as arguers — 
whether as arguers who are simply mistaken, or as fellow seekers after truth 
(2005, p. 13) 
Quite what this may involve is cashed out a little further by Williams in his discussion of 
the possibility of conflict between the values of equality and liberty, a possibility denied 
by Dworkin. Williams here speaks of the need for a “double-mindedness”, wherein we 
actively situate our own understanding of the demands of equality “in relation to other 
interpretations” (2005, p. 125). We decline simply to reject those other interpretations 
as mistaken and resultantly of no normative import; rather, we recognise that from the 
perspective of those who hold those other understandings, if our own favoured account 
is enacted, then they will feel resentment. This represents a genuine loss of liberty to 
them, given their opposing views. We are to come, then, to engage in a kind of relativizing 
of our own convictions.  
 Where stable recognition of the non-rational (even irrational), contingent nature 
of one’s political commitments has been achieved, one can see how it might go toward 
sustaining this kind of double-mindedness. After all, a recognition of the lack of firm 
rational foundation of one’s own commitments seems likely to produce a kind of 
intellectual humility that could lead one to pay due heed to the fact that others think 
differently. But achieving this stable recognition in the first place itself involves a 
different, prior kind of double-mindedness, namely the double-mindedness of indeed 
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recognising these origins of one’s own commitments while still holding them as 
commitments.  
Let us consider these senses of double-mindedness as forming components of a 
proposed political orientation for citizens generally to internalise and act upon.11 I want 
to argue that both the requirement to recognise the non-rational causes of our political 
convictions, and the subsequent implications this ought to have our political 
disagreements, are psychologically demanding to the extent that no consistent realist 
could expect either to achieve wide uptake in the cut and thrust of real world politics. 
However accurate Williams’s depiction of the causes of our convictions may be as a 
matter of description, it does not follow that the internalisation of this depiction can, for 
a realist, form the basis of feasible orienting action guidance.  
First, let us take the idea that we ought to recognise that our own specific political 
convictions find their cause in “an obscure mixture of beliefs (many incompatible with 
one another), passions, interests, and so forth” (2005, p. 13). We should first distinguish 
what’s at issue here from Williams’s broader thoughts about a thin liberalism12 “making 
sense” in conditions of “modernity” as an answer to the ‘Basic Legitimation Demand’ (i.e. 
the demand that political power offer a justification of its power to those over whom such 
power is wielded). In that regard, Williams has a story to tell about a socio-historical 
process, involving, inter alia, progressively increasing levels of ‘reflectiveness’ and the 
resultant unsettling of prior forms (e.g. religious, hierarchical) of ethical ‘knowledge’ 
(Williams, 1985). While for Williams there are no philosophical ‘foundations’ to be found 
for our modern commitment to this thin liberalism, so long as upon inspection a 
‘genealogical enquiry’ does not undermine our own understanding of why we have such 
a commitment, we can foster and retain a kind of “confidence” in it (Hall, 2014). 
Confidence in a moralist grounding of liberalism will not – so it is claimed – survive this 
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enquiry, because its metaphysical claims cannot be redeemed; by contrast, a liberalism 
that is clear-eyed about its own contingent ‘foundations’ may well do so.   
We are here concerned however not with this societal-level commitment to a 
generic and thin liberalism, but rather with the multiplicity of finer-grained political 
convictions, each compatible with that thin liberalism, that produce intra-societal 
political conflict. It is these convictions of which Williams is urging us to recognise the 
“obscure mix” of causes. At this level, though, it is far from clear that one will still feel 
‘confident’ in their convictions after they have confronted the fact that they are in large 
part caused by, inter alia, internally incompatible beliefs, rationalisation of self-interest, 
and emotional reaction.   
Indeed, such confrontation is more psychologically demanding that the 
recognition of the contingency of our commitments urged by the moralism of, for 
example, Rawls’s political liberalism. There, ‘reasonable’ citizens must recognise the 
‘burdens of judgement’: given the multiple difficulties that accrue to the employment of 
reason, we must recognise that there can be no final way to vindicate the moral 
conclusions that our employment of reason has reached when others have reached 
opposed conclusions. As has been pointed out, Rawls is here demanding  
an active and taxing psychological position … it is one thing to grant the truism 
that the concepts employed in framing our comprehensive doctrines are subject 
to hard cases or that we always select from an array of values that admit 
reasonable alternatives; it is quite another, when the doctrine I ardently uphold 
entails a particular resolution of a hard case or a certain choice from the range of 
available values, to acknowledge that opposing views are equally reasonable, and 
that the political significance of the doctrine I cherish must be curtailed by 
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deference to the reasonableness of beliefs I vehemently reject. (Callan, 1997, p. 
34)  
In crunch situations, we may well find it overly psychologically taxing to uphold 
recognition of the burdens of judgement. Or if we do manage to uphold such recognition, 
it may be difficult for the ‘ardency’ of our own commitments to withstand. 
 But although Rawls’s psychological position is indeed demanding, Williams’s is 
only more so, given Williams’s own depiction of political psychology. Williams asks 
persons to accept not simply that their political convictions represent one reasonable 
terminus of the employment of reason among others, but rather that their convictions 
are little to do with moral reason at all and are instead the product of potentially 
internally inconsistent beliefs, self-interest, socialisation, passion, and so forth. One way 
of putting things is to say that part of what Williams is doing is attempting to orient us 
toward recognition of realpsychologie. But the problem is that to anticipate that persons 
would be able so to orient themselves would be to ignore the realpsychologie premise 
itself. If we take realpsychologie seriously, then much more likely than the taking on board 
of Williamsian recognition of the causes of our convictions is the kind of post-hoc 
rationalisation of political commitment that political psychologists have recently been 
documenting (e.g. Lodge and Taber, 2013). There is ample empirical evidence, for 
instance, of the existence of “motivated reasoning” – that is, the biasing of the seeking and 
processing of information due to positive “affect” (i.e. non-rational, emotional 
attachment) for pre-existing commitments and a corresponding negative affective 
response to information that challenges those existing commitments (see e.g. Redlawsk, 
2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006).  
We would surely expect this kind of dynamic to hinder widespread recognition of 
the contingency of our convictions that Williams urges, since many persons already have 
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affective attachment to the notion that their political convictions are not merely theirs, 
but are correct (Haidt, 2012). Rather than judiciously consider and weigh arguments to 
the contrary, such persons are in fact likely to demonstrate negative bias in the way they 
process such arguments, and instead expend psychological energy on the identification 
of intellectual resources that can help rationalise their existing affective attachment. Such 
rationalisation amounts to something of a self-deception, but surely this sort of thing – 
the rejection of a reasoned proposition motivated by the desire to protect our pre-
existing emotional attachments – is entirely consistent with what realpsychologie would 
predict.  
 Let us turn nevertheless to the state of ‘double-mindedness’ that Williams thinks 
ought to follow from recognition of the causes of our own convictions. It in fact anticipates 
a radical change to the phenomenology of political disagreement. Williams at one point 
characterises those who believe that there exists a right that their favoured account of 
justice be enacted, and that others who disagree ought not to disagree (he speaks in 
particular of Dworkin again), as supposing “that all the urgency and dignity of justice 
applies to one’s own political interpretation of justice” (2005, p. 125). We are apparently 
to think this “very strong”, by which is meant “too strong”. But this reveals more about 
the curiosity of Williams’s view than Dworkin’s. For if one does indeed earnestly believe 
that an injustice is at hand, one will presumably also believe that such injustice demands 
urgent rectification as a matter of political priority – that seems to be internal to what it 
means to hold to an account of (in)justice. To understand one’s own account of justice as 
simply one interpretation among others, from which no urgent political implications 
ought necessarily to proceed, is to hold an emaciated understanding of justice that would 
perhaps only seem plausible to one – like the Williamsian realist  – who was already 
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sceptical about the very idea of producing a specific, prescriptive account of justice to 
which to be committed.  
 Moreover, and as David Enoch has clearly articulated, when two people disagree 
about the answer to what they nevertheless both recognise is a moral question (Enoch 
cites abortion), it feels like they are disagreeing “about an objective matter of fact, that 
exists independently of us and our disagreement” (2010, p. 212). This is true whether or 
not there really is such an objective matter of fact at hand. By contrast, where two persons 
disagree instead about some matter of personal preference (Enoch’s example is whether 
bitter chocolate is better than milk chocolate) the phenomenology of the disagreement 
(if we can be bothered to actively disagree about it at all) is different: more playful, 
perhaps even ironic. Williams apparently anticipates our coming to experience political 
disagreement as distinct from both moral disagreement and disagreement about 
personal preference: it is still to be taken seriously and considered important (these are 
to be our “opponents”, after all), but yet it will also be explicitly and mutually recognised 
that we are not disagreeing about any objective matter of fact.  
 This is quite a strange aspiration for a realist to hold. It’s certainly true that the 
picture of the phenomenology of political disagreement ascribed to the moralist –  i.e. 
experienced as that between the intellectually correct (us) and the intellectually 
mistaken interpreter of a moral text – is divorced from reality, not least because the cut 
and thrust of real world politics is in many instances experienced as disagreement 
between those in the right (us) and those who are not even trying to be right, but are 
instead pursuing their own disguised self-interest, or some other nefarious agenda. And 
yet, a realist who endorses Williams’s aspiration for political disagreement apparently 
hopes for what is in one sense an even more idealistic future, in which citizens not only 
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cease to ascribe ulterior motives to others, but in addition cease even to consider those 
others intellectually mistaken, or one’s own position morally justified.  
 Perhaps this is not in fact infeasible. But it will require a significant increase in 
trust in our fellow citizens, a corresponding increase in our own humility, and an ability 
reliably to restrain ourselves and retain in front of mind, during the heat of political 
conflict (not just in moments of quiet philosophical contemplation)13, the obscure, non-
rational causes of our own commitments. It is however a fundamental premise of what 
I’ve been calling realpsychologie that the ability of reason to keep our irrational emotions 
and passions in check in this kind of way is highly limited. In this case, the relevant piece 
of ‘reason’ is Williams’s own insight into the fundamental contingency of our political 
convictions. A consistent realist then either has to argue that our being consistently 
guided in our political practice by Williams’s insight does not fall foul of this premise of 
realpsychologie, or else must accept that such an insight cannot in practice meet the 
feasibility condition for being action guiding. We might reasonably ask any political 
realist seeking to argue the former how such a change in public attitude toward political 
disagreement might be possible without infringing upon the premises of their own 
political psychology. But no such answer to this question is offered by Williams or his 
followers.  
 
Realism as ideology critique 
As Raymond Geuss puts things at one point, “A “realist” in the sense in which I am using 
the term will…start from an account of our existing motivations and our political and 
social institutions” (2008, p. 59). ‘Start from’ does not mean ‘take as axiomatic’. Indeed, 
the latter is precisely what Geuss accuses two “nonrealistic approaches” – Robert 
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Nozick’s rights-based libertarianism, and Rawls’s privileging of our “intuitions” about 
justice – of doing. By contrast, the realist pays due heed to the fact that   
the reasons why we have most of the political and moral concepts we have (in the 
forms in which we have them) are contingent, historical reasons, and only a 
historical account will give us the beginnings of understanding of them and allow 
us to reflect critically on them rather than simply taking them for granted (2008, 
p. 69).  
What this historical account may well reveal to us is that prevailing sentiments, beliefs 
and ideas are ideological: they appear as universal or natural but are in fact maintained 
by particular “configurations of power” (2008, p. 53). Clearly there are similarities with 
Williams here, but with a difference in emphasis: while Williams emphasises the prospect 
of sustaining the endorsement of our convictions while recognising their true causes, 
Geuss by contrast emphasises the prospect of emancipating ourselves from ideological 
thinking. 
 Geuss explicitly refers to the idea of action guidance when distinguishing realist 
from ‘nonrealistic’ theory: 
If one thinks that a political theory can be a good guide to action only if it is 
minimally realistic, in the sense of being in cognitive contact with the real world, 
one will demand of a candidate theory that it actively encourage one to 
understand the ways in which power, interests, priorities, values, and forms of 
legitimation concretely interact in society. An “ideal theory” without contact to 
reality is, then, no guide to action (2008, p. 93-4). 
Geuss is here accusing ideal theory of failing to meet what I called the ‘conceptual 
condition’ for being action-guiding in the prescriptive sense. Ideal theory, by purportedly 
ignoring the role of power, in particular, just doesn’t get politics right: as he puts it in one 
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of his pithier statements, “modern politics is importantly about power, its acquisition, 
distribution, and use” (2008, p. 97). A theory, like Rawls’s, that doesn’t recognize this will 
not be able to offer us guidance about politics, and thus won’t be feasible as guidance for 
politics. By contrast, realist theory can guide action, in the orienting sense, by “actively 
encouraging one to understand” the ideological role of political power.  
 Geuss’s is a claim about what realist theorising can offer, but not, I suggest, an 
instance of it actually being offered. There are two ways in which this offering might 
occur: by providing individuals with the theoretical ‘tools’ they require to engage in their 
own realist ‘ideology critique’; or by practicing such critique oneself, enabling others to 
orient themselves by the findings of that critique.14 
 Janosch Prinz and Enzo Rossi engage in what I take to be the former course of 
action when they articulate the principles of an explicitly realist form of ideology critique 
which “seeks to be an instrument for agents’ understanding of their political and social 
order” (2017, p. 362), leading to the possibility of realising “action-orienting normative 
evaluation” from realist premises (2017, p. 349). They do this “with the help of recent 
developments in analytic philosophy of language and metaphysics, as well as of recent 
Frankfurt School Critical Theory” (2017, p. 357). What follows is as complex as that 
sounds and, frankly, somewhat opaque – I will not attempt to recapitulate their argument 
here, not least because I am not confident that I have understood it. This difficulty in 
understanding, though, is in itself significant. As noted, the authors want to offer a 
theoretical framework which can be “an instrument for agents’ understanding of their 
political and social order”. Which agents, though? I submit that an ‘instrument’ that 
requires nuanced understanding of analytic philosophy of language and metaphysics, as 
well as of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, will not be a usable instrument at all for the 
vast majority of people. One reason for this is the inevitable differences in cognitive 
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capacity to learn about these ideas and theories. Another is that of those that do have the 
cognitive capacity to do so, many will nevertheless simply lack the personal motivation 
to bother. These variations in cognitive capacity and motivation are, of course, tenets of 
realist realpsychologie.  
 To them we can add the simple fact of the division of labour in complex modern 
societies (cf. Bertram, 1997, p. 566): regardless of whether one might potentially have 
both the capacity and the motivation, persons pursue different professions, with their 
differing technical languages: it is distinctly unrealistic, therefore, to suppose that the 
technical language of some subset of highly trained academic philosophers might form 
the material for a widely useable political ‘instrument’. 
Is realist ideology critique then maybe supposed to be an ‘instrument’ only for a 
select group of agents, akin to Rorty’s ironic “intellectuals”?  Presumably not, since the 
very point of ideology critique is not the private enlightenment of those who are able to 
engage in it, but rather the stimulation of radical political change and resultant social 
emancipation (Geuss, 1981, pp. 73-75). In other words, the notional target is society at 
large. Such societal level change is however extremely unlikely to occur if the reasons 
why it should are destined to remain inaccessible to most people. Or at least, it is 
extremely unlikely to occur on account of the widespread employment of the instrument of 
realist ideology critique (clearly history is replete with formerly dominant modes of 
thinking being replaced). While the instrument of realist ideology critique may orient the 
thinking of some subset of a society, then, it is ultimately the society as a whole that the 
ideology critic wishes to orient – and if we take realpsychologie seriously, then we must 
surely say that they are destined to fail to do so.  
 Practicing realist ideology critique oneself, thereby demonstrating the instrument 
in action and offering the conclusions up as orientations to be used by others, will face a 
 32 
similar problem. Some people may indeed come to accept a particular conclusory idea – 
“the idea of private property is ideological”, for example (Rossi and Argenton, 2017) – but 
the complexity of the instrument used to derive that conclusion will insure that the 
reasons for such a conclusion are understood by only a few. Those who may accept the 
conclusory idea without encountering or understanding the reasons for it have not been 
guided by realist ideology critique at all, but have instead been ‘guided’ to the conclusory 
idea by other factors – perhaps by rhetoric, by self-interest, or by partisanship. All the 
sorts of things, that is, that realpsychologie urges us to take seriously.  
 
Conclusion 
Various political realists claim that their way of doing political theory is better able to 
offer action guidance than ‘liberal moralism’. I have identified two possible 
understandings of action guidance: the first, ‘prescriptive action guidance’, offers a 
specific prescription for how things should be; the second, ‘orienting action guidance’, 
offers a more generalised view about how we should conceive of some aspect of politics, 
which we can thereafter use to inform our political conduct. Realists have engaged in both 
kinds of pursuit – although mainly the second – and I have considered a selection here. 
Clearly, I have not been able to consider all existing cases, but those I have considered 
demonstrate a pattern that I believe will hold across the wider set. That pattern is one of 
political realisms that seek to offer action-guidance being unable to incorporate their own 
methodological premises – in particular, they are unable to pay due heed to what I have 
called realpsychologie.  
In order to incorporate recognition of realpsychologie at the point of action-
guiding output rather than methodological input, realist political theorists would 
seemingly need to be willing to subvert the very practice of political theorising: they 
 33 
would need to be willing to swap out what Iris Marion Young called “the soft tones of the 
seminar room”, the pursuit of theoretical nuance, and philosophical coherence, and 
instead to employ simple slogans, humour, and passionate rhetoric (2001, pp. 675-7). 
They would need to be willing to be strategically incoherent, to stoke fear where 
efficacious, and to explicitly appeal to our irrational, emotional side. They would need to 
be willing, that is, to be more like political actors, and less like political theorists.  
How, then, for a realist to react? There seem to be two main paths available. The 
first is to reject the aspiration to offer action-guiding political realism, and instead to 
remain in the realms of description and interpretation, as I noted at the outset that 
various realists indeed do. However, to make such a move would be to recede from what 
we noted in the introduction was one of the two main lines of criticism against liberal 
moralism, namely the latter’s perceived normative irrelevance. To retreat into 
description and interpretation is to admit that political realism in fact possesses little 
advantage in this respect.  
The alternative path is to offer some further systematic account of which 
particular aspects of realpsychologie are, and are not, relevant to normative theory 
construction. Realists are clearly right that our moral and political psychologies are far 
more complex than the essentially rationalist picture offered to us by Rawls. I have 
argued here, however, that if one takes this complexity in its entirety to be part-
constitutive of the perspective from which one adjudges whether a given theory is action-
guiding, then realists’ own normative offerings must themselves fail to be action-guiding. 
Might it then be possible to offer a philosophical defence of the circumscription of certain 
aspects of realpsychologie that are to be considered normatively relevant? Perhaps so, 
but the danger lurking for realists is that doing so would be in considerable tension with 
the central realist commitment to theoretical recognition of “the world as it is”. 
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Notes 
1 The other being liberal moralism’s purported descriptive inadequacy.  
2 Even in the move to ‘political liberalism’, we are still to “think of persons as reasonable and 
rational, as free and equal citizens, with the two moral powers and having, at any given moment, 
a determinate conception of the good” (Rawls, 1997, p. 800). 
3 Contributions to these meta-ethical debates about ‘action guidance’ are themselves not even 
notionally addressed to the public at large, but rather to other political theorists. Yet within these 
debates arguments are made that one methodological approach or another is best placed to 
provide public action-guidance. 
4 Note that a theory could meet all of these conditions and still be thought wrong. It would be 
action guiding, nonetheless. By analogy, if you ask me the way to the bank, I point you in the 
opposite direction, and you set off in the direction I point, then I have still successfully offered 
you directions, even if I haven’t offered you the right directions.  
5 Although some theorists dispute that action-guiding theories ought necessarily to be 
immediately feasible (e.g. Gheaus, 2013).  
6 Some political philosophers take the view that answering the ‘how’ question is not their domain 
(e.g. Swift, 2008).  
7 See, for example, Farrelly,2007; Miller, 2013; Mills, 2005; Sen, 2006; Weins, 2015. For a qualified 
defence of the action guiding qualities of ideal theory, see Valentini, 2009.  
8 For a rejection of the normative significance of the purported constitutive features of politics, 
see Erman and Möller, 2018.  
9 Notional because, as we made clear above, political theorists face a publicity problem which they 
tend to ignore.    





11 Williams does at various points give the impression that he is primarily targeting other political 
theorists rather than offering an orientation for citizens generally to take on. Yet this impression 
is not consistent. For instance, Williams writes that “Even if we were utopian monarchs, we would 
have to take into account others’ disagreement as a mere fact. As democrats, we have to do more 
than that” (2005, p. 13). Here there does appear to be a wide notional target in view (i.e. all “we” 
who are “democrats”).  
12 In this context “liberalism” is not the pejorative ‘liberalism moralism’ which realists criticise, 
but simply a commitment to general liberal ideas like individual liberty and toleration, aversion 
to cruelty, and the limitation of political power.  
13 We might draw an analogy with Hume’s philosophical scepticism, which he found necessarily 
subverted when leaving the ‘philosophical sphere’ and returning to the ‘sphere of common life’. 
14 Ed Hall suggests to me that Charles Mills’s work, in The Racial Contract (1997) and elsewhere, 
is a good example of the latter. However, while Mills certainly emphasises the ideological nature 
of certain political ideas – and indeed of ‘ideal theory’ generally – he is nevertheless ultimately 
working within a self-confessed ‘non-ideal’ liberalism. 
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